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Suggested contributions, membership categories, and discrete, incremental thank-you gifts are devices
often used by benevolent associations that provide public goods. Such devices focus donations into
discrete levels, thereby eectively limiting the donors' freedom to give. We study the eects on overall
donations of the tradeo between rigid schemes that severely restrict the choices of contribution on the
one hand, and exible membership contracts on the other, taking into account the strategic response
of contributors whose values for the public good are private information. We show exibility dominates
when i) the dispersion of donors taste for the public good increases, ii) the number of potential donors
increases, and iii) there is greater funding by an external authority. Using the number of default
membership categories that National Public Radio stations oer as proxy for exibility, we document
the existence of empirical correlations consistent with our predictions: stations oer a larger number of
suggested contribution levels as i) the incomes of the population served become more diverse, ii) the
population of the coverage area increases, and iii) there is greater external support from the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting.
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Private provision of public goods plays an important role in the US economy.1 Beyond familiar charities such
as the Red Cross and environmental groups like the Sierra Club, many local associations support orchestras,
zoos, community radio stations, and various other endeavors that can, at least in part, be thought of as public
goods. It is therefore not surprising that the economics literature provides multiple answers to the question
of why people give, including enlightened self-interest and altruism (e.g. Bergstrom et al., 1986), warm-glow
(e.g. Andreoni, 1989, 1990), prestige (Harbaugh, 1998a, 1998b), signaling (Glazer and Konrad, 1996), and
selective incentives (Olson, 1965). The psychology, sociology, and marketing literatures add many other
motivations, including the simple fact of being asked and the “even-a-penny-helps” technique.2 Fundraising
activities may well take into account all these motivations at various stages of a campaign.
We focus on one of the most common practices association managers and fund raisers use: accepting,
recommending, recognizing, or otherwise rewarding donations according to endogenously designed bins or
categories.3 This practice may take the form of a minimum suggested or accepted donation, of some level
that must be reached to publicize a donation, of aﬃxing nicknames to donation categories (e.g., in increasing
order of donation, “member,” “supporter,” “benefactor”), or more generally of oﬀering diﬀerent combinations
of selective incentives at various levels of contributions (for example, a bumper sticker for a $20 donation, a
bumper sticker and an audio cd for a $50 donation, and so on).
A number of questions naturally arise about this practice. What response does it elicit from donors?
How should levels that trigger beneﬁts be chosen? Are there any observable characteristics of the donor
population that push toward oﬀering a membership scheme with many levels rather than only a few?4 First,
we provide a simple theoretical framework in which to analyze these questions. Then, using data about the
membership schemes oﬀered by National Public Radio stations, we showcase empirical correlations consistent
with our ﬁndings.
We choose a “positive” theoretical approach, similar to the one of Harbaugh (1998a), who directly targets
the relationship between categories and prestige.5 Harbaugh (1998a) posits a pure warm-glow motivation
1For example, Andreoni (2006) reports that private giving hovers between 1.5% and 2.1% of personal income in the US.
2Bekkers and Wiepking (2007), in their review of the literature on philanthropy, state that “Many people have developed
cognitive strategies to reject responsibility for the welfare of others. One such strategy is the argument that ‘one cannot aﬀord
a donation.’ Legitimizing paltry contributions by adding the phrase ‘even a penny helps’ in a solicitation for contributions may
neutralize these strategies [citations omitted].”
3In our dataset, almost all NPR stations oﬀer “default” membership categories. For more details, see Table 3.
4See Table 3 for the distribution of “default” membership categories for NPR stations.
5Another theoretical approach to answer these questions is mechanism design. Indeed, Cornelli (1996), albeit tangentially to
her main goal of characterizing the optimal direct mechanism, suggests how implementation can occur through a scheme with
categories. However, extending the results in Cornelli (1996) to answer the questions we are interested in appears complicated.
Moreover, some authors describe the mechanism design approach as too complicated, too abstract, and too organizationally
taxing to provide a realistic account of a situation with very many potential donors (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1998). Others,
like Martimort and Moreira (forthcoming), comment on how a full-ﬂedged mechanism design approach requires a degree of
commitment power that may be excessive in a variety of situations.
1for giving (donors receive a private beneﬁt from their donations) and shows that, generically, creating one
category donations have to fall into to be recognized—and thus rewarded with the additional private good
“prestige”—dominates recognizing donations based on their exact amount. The force behind this result
is “bunching at the low end” of a category, an eﬀect empirically conﬁrmed in Harbaugh (1998b), and
experimentally observed by Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and by Li and Ryanto (2009). Transitioning from
exact to categorical recognition, “bunching” refers to donations that end up being clustered at the cutoﬀ
value that triggers the beginning of a category, rather than falling in a neighborhood on either side of such
cutoﬀ.
Beyond prestige, “bunching at the low end” can be expected for other motivations for giving as well.
Indeed, in a purely material selective beneﬁt example, consider a radio station that rewards donations
with discounts at various merchants. Suppose ﬁrst that discounts are directly proportional to the donated
amount, a scheme that may be thought of as having very many categories, and consider a donor willing
to give $20. Consider now a diﬀerent membership scheme where the reward is a ﬁxed discount level, but
only if the donation exceeds $25. The donor may then decide to bump up his contribution to $25, and a
similar behavior would be expected of all donors otherwise willing to donate an amount between, say, $20
and $24.99, thus creating bunching of contributions (in the absence of other strategic considerations). An
eﬀect going in the opposite direction is also possible when the continuous-beneﬁt scheme is replaced by the
discrete one, since donations of $25 and $26 are now rewarded in the same way, thus reinforcing bunching
toward $25.
From a theoretical point of view, the exact nature of the beneﬁt, whether prestige or a more general se-
lective incentive, is not fundamental to create bunching. Moreover, Croson and Marks (2001) experimentally
observe bunching even in the case of simple suggestions of donation levels. Indeed, a very similar eﬀect could
be reached, albeit simplistically, by restricting the agents’ ability to donate to exactly $25 or nothing at all.6
We ﬁnd this is the easiest way to think about the eﬀects of categories. Thus, our earlier questions can be
rephrased as: When does it pay for an association to restrict agents’ freedom to give? What determines
whether an association should oﬀer a rigid, restrictive membership scheme or a more ﬂexible one with many
categories?
After this reformulation, a natural place to look for an answer is the experimental literature comparing
discrete-level contribution models with those with continuous contributions. There appears to be an expec-
tation that continuous-level contribution schemes perform better. Cadsby and Maynes (1999), Hsu (2003),
6Beyond creating bunching, there are of course other reasons to discourage small but positive donations. For example,
extremely small donations may entail relatively large processing costs. Moreover, one may run the risk of legitimizing too small
a donation. Indeed, in describing the limitation of the “even-a-penny-helps” technique, Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) state
“...the phrase may even decrease the amount donated, exactly because it legitimizes paltry contributions [citation omitted].”
Also see footnote 2 above.
2and Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) report ﬁnding in experimental situations that allowing continuous con-
tribution possibilities signiﬁcantly increases contributions over requiring that contributors either contribute
nothing or their entire endowment. Authors explain this ﬁnding by noting that with continuous contribu-
tions there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with provision while no such equilibrium exists when the
contribution options are all or nothing (e.g., Cadsby and Maynes, 1999, p. 57). However, as Andreoni and
Petrie (2004) point out, the theoretical comparison between total contributions when all donation amounts
are possible and when agents’ freedom to give is restricted depends on what contribution levels are available.
No eﬀort in this direction appears in this literature.
Therefore, at least three aspects appear deserving of more study. First, while the warm-glow model
of Harbaugh’s is surely interesting, it is worth investigating the eﬀects of restricting agents’ freedom to
donate in a pure-public-good model, thereby reintroducing strategic considerations and free-riding into the
picture. Second, how is the optimal discrete contribution level chosen in this framework? Third, under
what conditions does the restricted contribution-level membership scheme perform better than one with
unrestricted levels? In particular, is one scheme always better than the other or does the choice reveal a true
trade-oﬀ? And in this last case, which observable characteristics of the donor population are important for
the trade-oﬀ?
Our basic theoretical model provides answers to these questions. We cast our analysis in a private-values
subscription game framework. As our baseline case, we suppose all donations are welcome, as in Barbieri
and Malueg (2009). Next, we consider the alternative policy in which the fundraisers specify a particular
contribution that they will accept. This policy imposes bunching of types, and, as a representation of actual
membership schemes, it favors simplicity over realism. After characterizing the optimal level for the accepted
contribution, we demonstrate the importance of the shape of the cumulative distribution function describing
players’ private values for the discrete good: if it is convex (concave), the single contribution threshold
(unrestricted contribution campaign) always raises greater contributions. While these cases are important
for identifying the forces that make the continuous or discrete contribution framework preferred, it is more
reasonable to expect the density of these values to be initially increasing and then decreasing if private values
for the public good are correlated with income.
In this last case—that is, when the cumulative distribution of values is ﬁrst convex and then concave—a
true trade-oﬀ emerges. We showcase the basic forces underlying the decision by the fundraisers whether to
restrict the freedom in choosing a contribution level by potential contributors, or to oﬀer a ﬂexible member-
ship scheme in which choices are less constrained. Two such forces are “dispersion of values” and “extent
of crowding-out,” leading to the following predictions. A membership scheme that restricts contributors’
decisions becomes less attractive as
31. the dispersion of values increases,
2. the number of potential contributors increases, or
3. the amount provided by an external authority increases.
Moreover, we show graphically and by example how these predictions remain valid when our basic model
is enriched to cope with more realistic membership schemes in which agents are free to donate any amount
they desire, but beneﬁts kick in only for donations above a pre-speciﬁed amount.
Finally, we turn our attention to the actual behavior of fundraisers and association organizers. Do they
appear to behave in a way consistent with the predictions of the model? We analyze the membership schemes
oﬀered by all National Public Radio stations in the continental US, proxying ﬂexibility with the number of
“default” membership levels oﬀered by a station, and we present empirical relations consistent with the three
predictions of our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3 we characterize
the unique symmetric equilibrium for both restricted- and unrestricted-level schemes, and we calculate the
optimal discrete contribution level. Section 4 explores the role of the shape of the distribution of values and
presents the implications of “dispersion of values” and “extent of crowding-out” on the choice of restricting
agents’ ﬂexibility to donate. Section 5 contains the empirical evidence and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We study the problem of n players who simultaneously contribute to the funding of a binary public good.
Player i’s value for the good is vi, i = 1,...,n. Players’ values are independently and identically distributed
random variables with cumulative distribution functions (cdf) F, which has support [0,1]. A player’s realized
value is known only to that player. We suppose F is continuous with density function f. The cost of the
public good is c, which we assume is a random variable uniformly distributed over the interval [0,¯ c], where
¯ c ≥ n, and c is independent of players’ values.7 The foregoing description is common knowledge.
In the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider the subscription game: players’ contributions
are refunded if they are insuﬃcient to cover c. If the good is provided, then the payoﬀ to player i is
vi − (player i’s contribution). If the good is not provided, then the payoﬀ to player i is 0.
7Beyond Barbieri and Malueg (2009), uncertainty in the cost appears in Nitzan and Romano (1990) and McBride (2006).
43 Equilibria
We look for a symmetric equilibrium strategy s. The expected utility of agent i with value vi contributing
x when other players use strategy s(·) is
Ui(x|vi) ≡ (vi − x)Pr







Because cost is distributed uniformly and independently of players’ values, if agent i contributes x, then the
probability that the good is provided is
Pr





























x + (n − 1)K
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,
where K ≡ E[s(vj)] is the expected contribution of agent j using strategy s. Now the expected utility of




(vi − x)(x + (n − 1)K). (2)
Note that if each player’s expected contribution is K, then the probability of provision is E[Pr(c ≤
P
s(vi))] =
nK/¯ c. Thus, any change in the fundraising mechanism that changes the expected contribution will directly
aﬀect the probability that the good is provided. Moreover, note that the uncertainty in the cost threshold c
makes our framework very close to the more traditional one of Bergstrom et al. (1986) in which the quantity
of the public good is variable and contributions are sunk. Indeed, if agents have a simple multiplicative
utility function over private and public good consumption, if vi is reinterpreted as income so that private
good consumption is vi − x, and if the public good is available at constant marginal cost ¯ c (so the total
provided just equals total donations divided by ¯ c), then the expected utility of agent i with income vi that
makes donation x is given in (2).
3.1 Unrestricted contribution possibilities
Here we characterize the unique equilibrium when any nonnegative contributions are allowed. Since Ui
in (2) is strictly concave in x, the ﬁrst-derivative ∂Ui(x|vi)/∂x = [vi − (n − 1)K − 2x]/¯ c, along with
the non-negativity constraint on x, yields the following “best-response” function for player i: s(vi) =
max{0,[vi − (n − 1)K]/2}. Using this best-response function and the deﬁnition of K above, in the sym-





















(1 − F(v))dv, (3)
where the ﬁnal inequality follows from integration by parts. The right-hand side of (3) is continuous and
strictly decreasing in K over [0,1/(n − 1)], with value E[v ]/2 > 0 at K = 0 and value 0 at K = 1/(n − 1).
Therefore, there is a unique value of K, which we denote by Kc, that solves (3). Consequently, with






2(v − (n − 1)Kc) if v ≥ (n − 1)Kc
0 otherwise,
(4)
where Kc solves (3) (it can be shown there are no asymmetric equilibria—see Barbieri and Malueg, 2009).
The following two-player example illustrates equilibrium in the subscription game with threshold uncertainty
when contributions are not restricted.
Example 1 (Values are distributed between 0 and 1 according to a convex cdf).
Consider two players whose values are independently and identically distributed on [0,1] according to
















the solution to which is Kc ≈ 0.223462, which is also each player’s expected contribution.
3.2 Binary contribution possibilities
Next we suppose players are restricted to contribution levels of 0 and x, where x ∈ (0,1). The equilibrium





x if v ≥ v0
0 if v < v0,
6for some value v0. Suppose all players but player 1 use such a strategy. If player 1 has value v, her expected
payoﬀ when not contributing is







 = v ×
(n − 1)(1 − F(v0))x
¯ c
,
and her expected payoﬀ when contributing x is







 = (v − x) ×
x + (n − 1)(1 − F(v0))x
¯ c
.
Solving the indiﬀerence condition Unc(v) = Uc(v) yields the threshold value
v0 = x[1 + (n − 1)(1 − F(v0))] = x + (n − 1)K, (5)
where K = x(1−F(v0)) is a player’s expected contribution. The middle expression in (5) is strictly decreasing
in v0, with value nx when v0 = 0 and value x when v0 = 1, implying that for each x ∈ (0,1), there is a
unique solution v0 to (5). Hence, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the subscription game with
binary contribution possibilities.
The following example applies the above analysis to show the common intuition favoring unrestricted
contributions over discrete contribution possibilities may not be warranted.
Example 2 (The probability of provision: binary or continuous contribution possibilities).
We again suppose there are two players, values are independently and identically distributed on [0,1]
according to the cdf F(v) = v2, and cost is uniformly distributed over [0,¯ c], where ¯ c ≥ 2. From Example 1
we know that each player’s expected contribution in the unrestricted-contribution case is Kc ≈ 0.223462.
Next suppose players’ contributions are restricted to be either 0 or x (we may assume x ≤ 1). Equilibrium





x if v ≥ v0
0 if v < v0,
where solution of the ﬁrst equality of (5) yields the critical threshold v0(x) =
 √
1 + 8x2 − 1

/(2x). Each






1 + 8x2 − 1 − 2x2
/(2x). This expected






/4 ≈ 0.424035; the
resulting expected contribution of each player is K(x∗) ≈ 0.238118, which exceeds the expected contribution
in the unrestricted-contribution model by about 6%. Identical conclusions hold as well for the probability
7of provision in the two settings. Obviously, though, for “poor” choices of x, the binary-contribution model
yields strictly lower contributions than does the unrestricted model.
Example 2 clariﬁes how the choice of level for the restricted contribution scheme is crucial. For the rest
of the analysis, we denote with Kd a player’s equilibrium expected contribution when the only contributions
allowed are {0,xd}, where xd is the level that maximizes the equilibrium expected contribution. Thus,
Kd = [1 − F(v0)]xd, where v0 is the threshold value above which a player contributes, and, by (5), v0 =
xd + (n − 1)Kd. At xd, the ﬁrst-order condition dKd/dxd = 0 implies
1 − F(v0) = xdf(v0). (6)
The following lemma, building on (5) and (6), is useful for the rest of the analysis.
Lemma 1 (Bounding the best binary contribution). Let F be the common distribution of the n players’
independent values.
1. If F is convex on [v0,1], then xd ≥ [1 − (n − 1)Kd]/2, with strict inequality if F is strictly convex on
[v0,1].
2. If F is concave on [v0,1], then xd ≤ [1 − (n − 1)Kd]/2, with strict inequality if F is strictly concave
on [v0,1].
Proof. If F is convex on [v0,1], then 1 = F(1) ≥ F(v0) + f(v0)(1 − v0), so
xd =
1 − F(xd + (n − 1)Kd)
f(xd + (n − 1)Kd)
(by (5) and (6))





(1 − (n − 1)Kd). (8)
If F is strictly convex on [v0,1], then the inequality in (7) holds strictly, and so too does (8). If instead F
is concave on [v0,1], then the inequality in (7) is reversed as is that in (8), with strict inequality holding in
both (7) and (8) if F is strictly concave on [v0,1].
84 Continuous or discrete contributions?
If instead of allowing all contribution levels, the fundraisers restrict contributions to a ﬁnite set, then they
face a tradeoﬀ. On the one hand, some who might have preferred to give a positive amount now ﬁnd
themselves unwilling to give the minimum acceptable amount, which may reduce overall contributions. On
the other hand, some who had planned to give an “intermediate” amount might now prefer to bump up their
contributions to the minimum acceptable level, causing them to contribute more than they might otherwise
have done, and this tends to raise contributions. Overall, the eﬀect of setting a target contribution will
balance these two eﬀects, causing some potential contributors to drop out while encouraging others to give
slightly more.
4.1 The cases of convex or concave F
Our ﬁrst proposition shows that, when the density of players’ values is either increasing or decreasing,
fundraisers have a clear preference for either the continuous or the binary contribution scheme.
Proposition 1 (Continuous versus binary contributions). Let the common distribution of players’ indepen-
dent values be F.
1. If F is convex, then Kd ≥ Kc, with strict inequality if F is strictly convex.
2. If F is concave, then Kd ≤ Kc, with strict inequality if F is strictly concave.
Proof. First suppose F is convex. The equilibrium contribution function in the continuous game is sc(v) =
max{0,[v−(n−1)Kc]/2}. Deﬁne x∗ = sc(1) = [1−(n−1)Kc]/2; in the equilibrium of the binary contribution
game with {0,x∗} denote by K∗ a player’s expected contribution. Because xd maximizes a player’s expected
contribution, it must be that Kd ≥ K∗. We will show K∗ ≥ Kc, with strict inequality if F is strictly convex,
thereby proving part 1. Let ϕ denote a uniform probability distribution on the interval [(n − 1)Kc,1] (the
use of this distribution will become clear below). The proof is by contradiction, so suppose the proposition
is false, that is, K∗ < Kc. Then
K∗ = x∗[1 − F(x∗ + (n − 1)K∗)]
















































contradicting the assumption that K∗ < Kc. (The last equality follows from (3).) If, further, F is strictly
convex, then the contradiction hypothesis becomes K∗ ≤ Kc and the inequality in (9) becomes weak while
that in (10) becomes strict, again yielding a contradiction. This establishes part 1.
Next suppose F is concave, and suppose contrary to part 2 that Kd > Kc. Then Lemma 1 implies that
xd < (1 − (n − 1)Kc)/2 = sc(1). We will show that the binary game with positive contribution xd yields




(n − 1)Kc v0 v∗ 1
Figure 1: Comparison of binary and continuous expected contributions when F is concave.
Figure 1 shows the comparison being made, where v∗ solves sc(v) = xd. It is readily checked that
v∗ = (n − 1)Kc + 2xd. By (5), the associated binary-contribution game equilibrium has threshold value
v0 = (n − 1)Kd + xd. Let ϕ denote a uniform probability distribution on the interval [(n − 1)Kc,v∗]. A














































(by sc(v∗) = xd) (12)
= xd [1 − E[F(v)|ϕ]]
≥ xd [1 − F(E[v |ϕ])] (by F concave) (13)
= xd 
1 − F((n − 1)Kc + xd)

≥ xd 
1 − F((n − 1)Kd + xd)

(by contradiction)
= xd[1 − F(v0)] (by (5))
= Kd,
contradicting the assumption that Kd > Kc. If, further, F is strictly concave, then the contradiction
hypothesis becomes Kd ≥ Kc and the inequality in (11) becomes weak while that in (13) becomes strict,
again yielding a contradiction. This establishes part 2.
Example 2 illustrates the ﬁrst parts of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. The intuition for Proposition 1
can be understood with reference to Figure 2, which depicts equilibrium strategies when players’ values are
uniformly distributed over [0,1]. In this case, xd = sc(1) and Kc = Kd. The restriction to contributing
either 0 or xd leads types above v0 to contribute more than in the continuous case, a beneﬁt represented
by region B. But this restriction causes types below v0 to contribute nothing, and this cost is represented
by region A. For the uniform distribution, v0 is midway between (n − 1)Kc and 1, so the areas of regions
A and B are equal. And because the distribution of v is uniform, the weighted beneﬁt of region B equals
the weighted cost of region A. Now suppose the distribution of values deviates from uniform by becoming
slightly convex (i.e., the density is slightly increasing). Then, ignoring the induced change in strategies
as a ﬁrst-approximation, the weight on region B becomes larger than that on region A, so the binary-
contribution setting yields greater contributions than the unrestricted setting. The comparison is reversed
if the distribution becomes slightly concave, as then region A receives greater weight than region B. This












Figure 2: Comparison of binary and continuous strategies when F is concave: Kc = Kd.
4.2 The role of heterogeneity and crowding-out
When the cdf of players’ values is neither concave nor convex, Proposition 1 does not yield a deﬁnitive
comparison. It is however possible to obtain insights for the case of a symmetric distribution F that is ﬁrst
convex and then concave. We provide an instance of such distribution in our leading example for this section.
Example 3 (Triangular distribution). Consider the density of v given by f(v;a) = (1 − (1/4)a) + av for
v ∈ [0,1/2] and f(v;a) = (1 − (1/4)a) + a(1 − v) for v ∈ (1/2,1], where a ∈ [0,4] parameterizes the
“peakedeness” of the distribution, as deﬁned in Proschan (1965). When a is zero, we have the usual uniform
distribution on [0,1]. As a increases, the weight on the tails of the distribution decreases and concentrates
around the mean/median of 1
2.
A ﬁrst result, very useful for the rest of our analysis, is the following necessary condition for binary
contributions to dominate continuous contributions.8
Proposition 2 (Comparison of binary and continuous contributions). Suppose the distribution F of players’
values is symmetric with mean and median µ. Furthermore, assume F is strictly convex for v < µ and F is
strictly concave for v > µ. If Kd ≥ Kc, then v0 < µ.
By Proposition 2 (a proof of which is in the Appendix), setting a ﬁxed donation level such that v0 > µ is
counterproductive for the fundraiser. This result is intuitive, given the discussion preceding Proposition 1.
There is a tradeoﬀ in restricting agents’ freedom to give. On the one hand, some who might have preferred
to give a positive amount ﬁnd themselves unwilling to give the minimum acceptable amount. On the other
hand, some who had planned to give an “intermediate” amount now prefer to bump up their contributions.
8Symmetry is not essential for the result. For example, the proof and ﬁgure (in the Appendix) are easily adapted to a
positively skewed distribution ˜ F that coincides with F for values less than the median µ, but ˜ F ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates F for v > µ.
12The cutoﬀ between these two diﬀerent responses to a restriction is v0: types immediately below v0 become
non-contributors. If the fundraiser’s choice puts v0 in the concave part of the distribution, then types
immediately below v0—those who reduce their contribution—outnumber types immediately above v0. We
illustrate this reasoning for the all-important case Kc = Kd.
Figure 3 depicts the same comparison between the equilibrium contribution functions as in Figure 1, and
we have superimposed a symmetric density function, labeled f(v), for values. In Figure 3, because of the
assumption Kc = Kd, triangles A and B are congruent since v0 − (n − 1)Kc = v0 − (n − 1)Kd = xd. The
continuous contribution scheme dominates in area C. Therefore, according to the density f, area B must









v0 v0 + xd 1 µ
f(v)
Figure 3: If f is symmetric and single-peaked and if Kc = Kd, then v0 < µ.
We now establish comparative statics for the binary contribution possibilities. The following proposition
applies to all symmetric distributions F(v;a) that are strictly convex for v that goes from zero to the
mean/median µ, strictly concave thereafter, and where the parameter a captures peakedness as in Example 3.
Proposition 3 (Comparative statics for binary contributions). If v0 > µ, then Kd decreases in a. If v0 < µ,
then Kd increases in a.
Proof. Adapting the deﬁnition in Proschan (1965), for a1 > a0, the distribution F(v;a1) is more peaked







which, in our symmetric distribution environment, implies F(v;a0) ≥ F(v;a1) if v ≤ µ, and F(v;a0) ≤





Applying the implicit function theorem with respect to a to the system composed of equation (5), of equation
(6), and of the deﬁnition of Kd yields, after rearrangement
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Therefore, using (14), dK
d
da has the opposite sign of (v − µ), thus establishing the proposition.
Proposition 3 is especially interesting in comparison with the continuous-contribution case. From Barbieri
and Malueg (2009) we know that Kc is always decreasing in a (essentially this follows from the convexity of
the contribution strategy in the continuous case). In contrast, the relationship for the binary contribution
possibilities case depends on the position of the threshold type v0 relative to µ. This dependence is intuitive.
If v0 < µ and peakedness increases, then, even leaving xd unchanged, the types above µ continue to contribute
xd and among those types below µ the number who are contributors increases, so overall contributions
increase. Allowing for optimal adjustment of the contribution level xd can further raise donations at the
more peaked distribution. When v0 > µ, an analogous eﬀect shows that a small increase in peakedness will
decrease expected donations in the binary-contribution case.
A consequence of Propositions 2 and 3 is a ranking of total contributions Kd and Kc that depends on
the peakedness of the distribution.
Proposition 4 (Peakedness-induced ordering). As peakedness of the distribution F(v;a) increases, at most
one intersection between Kd and Kc can occur, at which Kd becomes larger than Kc.
Proof. Assume ﬁrst, by contradiction, that an intersection between Kd and Kc occurs at which Kc becomes
larger than Kd. Then there exists a point at which Kd = Kc, but dKc/da ≥ dKd/da. However, Proposition 2
implies v0 < µ, and Proposition 3 further implies dKd/da > 0, thus yielding dKc/da > 0, which contradicts
the fact that dKc/da < 0, as established in Barbieri and Malueg (2009, Proposition 5).
Using the family of distributions in Example 3, Table 1 illustrates Propositions 2–4. In accord with
Proposition 3, for a = 0,1,2, we have v0 ≥ µ and increases in peakedness reduce Kd; but for a = 2,3,4,
we have v0 ≤ µ and increases in a increase Kd. The data also reﬂect Proposition 4’s conclusion that as the
distribution becomes more peaked, the binary scheme may come to dominate the continuous-contribution
scheme (here the ranking switches for a value of a lying between 3 and 4). Note too that Kd > Kc when
14Table 1: Results for optimal continuous or binary contribution schemes, depending on peakedness, n = 2
a Kc Kd xd v0
0 0.17157 0.17157 0.41421 0.58578
1 0.17058 0.16779 0.37242 0.54021
2 0.16961 0.16667 0.33333 0.5
3 0.16865 0.16718 0.31415 0.48133
4 0.16772 0.16837 0.29984 0.46821
a = 4, so Proposition 2 implies v0 < µ, which is indeed the case here (v0 = 0.46821 < .5 = µ). More
generally, whether the graphs of Kd and Kc intersect depends on the available range for the peakedness.
One may show that if the distribution F(v,a) goes, in order of increasing peakedness, from uniform on [0, ¯ v],
to a degenerate distribution on µ = ¯ v/2, then the intersection will happen.9
The relationship between the binary vs. continuous comparison and peakedness, as just discussed, is intu-
itive. Oﬀering only a limited number of alternative contribution levels—the binary contribution possibilities
is an extreme case—is a way to target a subset of types (those in a right neighborhood of v0) and induce
them to contribute more than they otherwise would. Clearly, this eﬀect obtains because agents have fewer
contribution options. The down side of this restriction of contribution possibilities is that some types may
choose to contribute less than they otherwise would. Types smaller than the target may decide to contribute
nothing at all while they would have contributed a smaller, but positive amount, if given the opportunity.
Similarly, types larger than the target may be constrained to contribute less than they would have done if
given more alternatives. The situation is illustrated in Figure 3 for Kc = Kd. Now increase peakedness
slightly, and, as a ﬁrst-approximation, suppose in the two scenarios players continue using the strategies
depicted. An increase in peakedness of the distribution of values tends to reduce the signiﬁcance of regions
A and C while increasing that of region B, so that the equivalence of donations under the two contribution
schemes breaks in favor of Kd as F becomes more peaked.
We now hold peakedness constant and consider how changes in the number of potential contributors
aﬀect the relationship between Kd and Kc.
Proposition 5 (Number-of-player-induced ordering). As the number of players n increases, at most one
intersection between Kd and Kc can occur, at which Kc becomes larger than Kd. Moreover, for n suﬃciently
large, Kc > Kd.
Proof. It is immediate to verify that both Kc and Kd are decreasing in n. Therefore, the ﬁrst part of the
9When F is a degenerate distribution at µ, players contribute some common ﬁxed amount s0 in the Nash equilibrium with
unrestricted contributions. In the best discrete contribution scheme, the fundraiser will generally choose a level xd 6= s0; for
this reason, Kd > Kc when F is a degenerate distribution.











 . From equations (3)–(6) and the


















1 + (n − 1)(1 − F(v0))
Kd −
1 − F((n − 1)Kc)




1 + (n − 1)(1 − F(v0))
Kc −
1 − F((n − 1)Kc)
2 + (n − 1)(1 − F((n − 1)Kc))
Kc (Kd ≥ Kc is assumed)
=

1 − 2F(v0) + F((n − 1)Kc)




where the ﬁnal inequality follows because v0 < µ (which follows from Proposition 2) implies F(v0) < 1/2.
To show that for n suﬃciently large Kd < Kc, proceed by contradiction; that is, suppose that there
exists some N0 such that for all n > N0, Kd ≥ Kc (the possibility of multiple intersections is excluded
by the analysis of the previous paragraph). By Proposition 2, it must be that v0 < µ, for all n > N0.
From the deﬁnition of Kd we have Kd ≥ xd/2, and by equation (6) xd ≥ 1/(2f(v0)) ≥ 1/(2f(µ)), which
together imply limn→∞ Kd ≥ 1/(4f(µ)) > 0; therefore limn→∞ v0 = limn→∞ (n − 1)Kd +xd = +∞, which
contradicts v0 < µ.
The following example illustrates Proposition 5.
Example 4 (Triangular distribution continued). Consider three players and the same distribution the density
f(v;a) in Example 3. For a = 4 we have Kc = 0.12778 and Kd = 0.125. A comparison with the previous
calculations for the two-player case in Table 1 reveals that in moving from 2 to 3 players, the ranking of Kc
and Kd switches, ﬁxing peakedness at a = 4, in accordance with Proposition 5.
It turns out that the main force underlying our result on the number of agents is the same we identify
in the next proposition about crowding-out. Let y denote the level of contributions that are exogenously
provided by an external authority, and consider how players’ contributions change as y increases. Replicating







(1 − F(v))dv. (15)
Similarly, when contributions are restricted, the indiﬀerent type v0, the optimally chosen level xd, and the
16expected contribution amount Kd solve
v0 = xd + (n − 1)Kd + y, xd =
1 − F(v0)
f(v0)
, and Kd = xd(1 − F(v0)). (16)
We now hold constant all other parameters and consider how changes in the amount y, exogenously given
by an external authority, aﬀect the relationship between Kd and Kc. (The proof of Proposition 6, which is
similar to that for Proposition 5, is given in the Appendix.)
Proposition 6 (Crowding-out-induced ordering). As the amount y increases, at most one intersection
between Kd and Kc can occur, at which Kc becomes larger than Kd.
The following example illustrates Proposition 6.
Example 5 (Triangular distribution continued). Consider two players and the same distribution the density
f(v;a) in Example 3. For a = 4 and y = 0, as derived in our previous calculations in Table 1, Kc = 0.16772
and Kd = 0.16837. For a = 4 and y = 0.1 we have Kc = 0.13626 and Kd = 0.13341. Thus, the ranking of
Kc and Kd switches as we increase y, in accordance with Proposition 6.
Propositions 5 and 6 are two manifestations of the same main force. Contributions from a membership
scheme that restricts contributors’ decisions are more responsive to changes in the environment (e.g., an
increase in the number of potential contributors or an increase in external donations) than contributions
from a more ﬂexible scheme, conditional on the fundraiser being indiﬀerent between the two, that is for
Kc = Kd. The intuition for the result is that a ﬂexible mechanism allows agents wishing to reduce their
contributions to do so in a smooth, measured manner that is largely independent of their value. Indeed, in
equilibrium, a given change in the expected donation of one player is achieved because (almost) all types who
were contributing a positive amount end up reducing their donation by a common quantity. The adjustment
is very diﬀerent in a rigid membership scheme. The only possibility to reduce one’s donation is to stop
contributing at all. True to its characterization, a rigid membership scheme “breaks but does not bend” and
forces a jerky response from agent types: types suﬃciently far from v0 do not change their behavior at all,
while types suﬃciently close to v0 precipitously drop their contribution from x to nothing.10 Which of the
the smooth or the jerky adjustments ends up being larger then depends on the relative importance of types
near v0. As discussed earlier and as depicted in Figure 3, when the fundraiser is indiﬀerent between the
ﬂexible or the rigid scheme, that is for Kd = Kc, it must be the case that types near v0 are very important,
and the jerky adjustment ends up being larger in expectation. Therefore, the larger the number of potential
10In the words of Bergstrom et al. (1986), the jerky response happens only at the “extensive” margin, while the smooth
response happens mostly at the “intensive” margin.
17contributors or the amount provided by external sources, the larger the crowding-out for a rigid contribution
scheme, relative to a ﬂexible one, up to the point in which ﬂexibility becomes preferred by the fundraisers.
4.3 Beneﬁt-induced restrictions
The main objective of this section is showing that our earlier results, in particular Propositions 4, 5, and 6,
survive when we consider a more realistic membership scheme in which agents are free to donate any amount
they desire. “Restrictions” in donations arise from the package of selective beneﬁts. With respect to the
model in Section 2, nothing changes about the way in which agents beneﬁt from the public good. However,
we now assume that contributors also enjoy a selective beneﬁt b(x), distributed by the association in exchange
for a donation level x. We maintain the assumption, typical of the subscription game, that if the public good
cannot be produced, then agents receive their contributions back and obtain a payoﬀ of zero. When the
public good is produced, for simplicity, we assume b(x) enters additively in the utility function, so that the




(vi + b(x) − x)(x + (n − 1)K + y).
We consider two ways in which fundraisers allocate selective beneﬁts. In the ﬁrst, b equals an exogenously
speciﬁed amount q > 0, but only if the donation x exceeds an endogenously chosen level xd
b. Otherwise,
b = 0. We label this the “discrete-beneﬁt” scheme. In the second, b is a simple linear function of donations:
b(x) = αx, with α > 0. This formulation resembles Harbaugh’s (1998a) introduction of “prestige” that results
from contributions. If contributions are reported exactly, more prestige is “bought” with larger contributions,
and we specify a proportional representation of this. If categories are introduced, as in Harbaugh, then
after a donor contributes, the receiver simply reports publicly in which category that donor’s contribution
fell.11 Alternatively, we introduce a single category, where anyone contributing at least xd is reported to
be a member of this category and thereby receives prestige beneﬁt of q when the good is also provided.
An important diﬀerence with Harbaugh’s setup remains: A contributors’ utility depends on other agents’
donations; thus, strategic considerations remain paramount.
For the “continuous-beneﬁt” scheme it is easy to retrace our steps leading to (4) and to show that in the
11For example, the New Orleans Preservation Resource Center identiﬁes major donors by their membership in categories des-
ignated as Italianate ($25,000 and above), Greek Revival ($15,000–$24,999), Romanesque Revival ($10,000–$14,999), Steamboat
Gothic ($5,000–$9,999), Queen Anne ($2,500–$4,999), Landmark ($1,000-$2,499), and Conservator ($500–$999).
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b(v)], and y is the amount exogenously provided by an external authority—as in
Proposition 6.
For the discrete-beneﬁt scheme, types donating amounts smaller than xd
b, that is, types for which b(x) = 0,
either do not contribute, or if they do, they donate 1
2(v−(n−1)Kd
b −y), where Kd
b is the equilibrium expected
contribution. Proceeding in a similar fashion, types that donate more than xd
b (they receive beneﬁt b(x) = q)
contribute 1
2(v+q−(n−1)Kd
b −y). The previously mentioned agents have very low or very high values. For
intermediate values, the possibility of capturing the beneﬁt b(x) = q, through an upwards departure from
x = 1
2(v − (n − 1)Kd
b − y) to x = xd
b, may prove attractive. Indeed, after comparing the appropriate utility
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b + y + xd
b).
(Note also that types larger than (n − 1)Kd
b + y + 2xd
b − q contribute more than xd
b.)
The following ﬁgure depicts sc
b(v) and sd
b(v) and, for ease of notation, we indicate with vc
b (vd
b) the
value at which the continuous-beneﬁt (discrete-beneﬁt) equilibrium strategy becomes positive. By the above
descriptions, vc
b = ((n − 1)Kc
b + y)(1 − α) and vd
b = (n − 1)Kd
b + y.
Figure 4 shows that the comparison of discrete-beneﬁt vs. continuous-beneﬁt schemes is very similar to
the comparison of discrete-level vs. continuous-level schemes in Figure 3: if Kc
b = Kd
b, then discrete does
better in area B while continuous is superior in areas A and C. All earlier graphical intuitions about the
advantages and pitfalls restricting agents’ freedom to donate carry over to a scheme that restricts agents’
















Figure 4: Comparison of discrete-beneﬁt and continuous-beneﬁt expected contributions.





(1) n = 2, y = 0, a = 1 0.17607 0.03119 0.17526 0.20759
(2) n = 2, y = 0, a = 4 0.17361 0.03393 0.17383 0.20826
(3) n = 3, y = 0, a = 4 0.13348 0.04271 0.13307 0.16482
(4) n = 2, y = 0.1, a = 4 0.14325 0.04014 0.14294 0.17575
expect the comparative statics about Kd and Kc in Propositions 4–6 to remain valid for their respective
analogues Kd
b and Kc
b, as conﬁrmed by the next example.
Example 6 (Triangular distribution continued). Consider the same distribution the density f(v;a) in Ex-
ample 3. Let the value of selective beneﬁts for the discrete-beneﬁt scheme, q, be 0.01. The marginal value
of selective beneﬁts for the continuous-beneﬁt scheme, α, is endogenously determined so that the equilibrium
average expected beneﬁt is identical for the two schemes. Table 2 summarizes the relevant quantities.
From Table 2 we see the switches in the order of Kc
b and Kd
b are all in accordance with Propositions 4–6.
Indeed, increasing peakedness, a, favors the discrete-beneﬁt scheme, as the comparison of conﬁgurations (1)
and (2) shows. Moreover, the continuous-beneﬁt scheme is favored by an increase in the number of players,
n, as conﬁgurations (2) and (3) show, and by an increase in the amount y exogenously provided by an
external authority, as conﬁgurations (2) and (4) show.12
The intuitive reason for why the relative position of areas A, B, and C is the one depicted in Figure 4
is straightforward. The position of area A is determined by the larger likelihoood of positive contributions
12We have also performed numerical comparisons between a scheme with one beneﬁt level and a two-level scheme, and we ﬁnd
the same patterns as in Table 2. Indeed, the relatively more ﬂexible two-level scheme generates larger expected contributions
than the rigid one-level scheme when there are increases i) in the dispersion of values, ii) in the number of players, and iii) in
the amount exogenously provided by an external authority. Full details are available upon request.
20under the ﬂexible scheme, which arises because even very small contributions are rewarded with selective
beneﬁts, in contrast with the rigid scheme. Area C reﬂects the fact that, under the ﬂexible scheme, the
marginal selective beneﬁt is positive, while it is almost always zero under the rigid scheme. Thus, the
incentive to contribute more than xd
b in the rigid scheme comes only from the increase in the probability
of provision. In contrast, under the ﬂexible scheme, there arises the additional prize of a larger selective
incentive. Therefore, it is not surprising that contributions larger than xd
b are more frequent in the ﬂexible
scheme, as depicted in area C. Finally, since the ﬂexible mechanism dominates for small and large values
and since Figure 4 is drawn under the assumption Kc
b = Kd
b, it must be the case that the rigid mechanism
dominates for intermediate values, as described by area B.
5 Empirical evidence: default membership levels for NPR stations
Before entering into details, it is worth highlighting our objective for this section. In no way are we considering
the model in Section 2 and “bringing it to the data.” Our theoretical model is, by design, very stylized. Its
purpose is to showcase the basic forces underlying the decision by the fundraisers whether to restrict the
freedom in choosing a contribution level by potential contributors, or to oﬀer a ﬂexible membership scheme
in which agents’ choices are less constrained. Two such forces we identiﬁed are “dispersion of values” and
“extent of crowding-out,” leading to these three predictions:
P1. The larger the dispersion of values, the less attractive becomes a membership scheme that restricts
contributors’ decisions (Proposition 4).
P2. The larger the number of potential contributors, the less attractive becomes a membership scheme that
restricts contributors’ decisions (Proposition 5).
P3. The larger the amount provided by an external authority, the less attractive becomes a membership
scheme that restricts contributors’ decisions (Proposition 6).
While the proofs of the respective propositions depend on the details of our model, we believe the intuitions
we provided transcend them. In this section we explore the basic consistency of the membership schemes we
see actually used with the three predictions described above.
The main data for this section are information on number of diﬀerent membership levels oﬀered by
National Public Radio (NPR) stations, geographic and socio-economic information about the populations
they serve, and funding amounts provided to NPR stations by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB). While the empirical literature that treats NPR stations as producers of public goods is vast (see, for
example, Berry and Waldfogel, 1999; Kingma, 1989; and Manzoor and Straub, 2005), we believe our analysis
21is the ﬁrst to investigate the relationship between the demographics of a station’s audience and the structure
of the fundraising scheme oﬀered by that station. In our quest to document basic relationships consistent
with P1–P3, we proxy ﬂexibility of the membership scheme with the number of diﬀerent membership levels
oﬀered by a station, dispersion of values with income inequality, number of agents with adult population
served, and contributions by an external authority with CPB funding.
5.1 Data
Data are drawn from a variety of sources. We began with a list of all NPR stations operating in the
continental United States, available at http://www.npr.org/stations/pdf/nprstations.pdf. This list
provides a ﬁrst geographical indication of the coverage area in addition to call letters—e.g. KDAQ for the
NPR station in Shreveport, LA—that, in combination with the FM or AM frequency, uniquely identify
NPR stations. Our information on geographic coverage is integrated with maps from Radio-Locator. From
the website http://www.radio-locator.com we obtained descriptions of the predicted coverage area of
each NPR station. We organized geographic information as follows. First, we included all metropolitan or
micropolitan statistical areas falling within the predicted coverage pattern.13 In the few cases in which there
are no metropolitan or micropolitan areas within the coverage pattern, we chose to assign as geographic area
the counties falling within the coverage pattern. Radio-Locator also provides the website of each station.
In many cases, a few diﬀerent NPR stations all link to the same website. These stations are eﬀectively
operating, as far as membership campaigns are concerned, as a single entity, namely, a network of NPR
stations (e.g., KDAQ in Shreveport, LA; KLSA in Alexandria, LA; KBSA in El Dorado, AK; and KLDN in
Lufkin, TX, all constitute the “Red River Radio” network, with website www.redriverradio.org).
Our information on default membership levels comes from the websites of stand-alone NPR stations and
the NPR station networks. In particular, we ﬁrst followed links such as “donate now” or “support” or
“pledge now” and counted the number of diﬀerent options oﬀered.14 Finally, we searched the websites for
“leadership circles,” “producers’ clubs,” or other similar monikers for large donations. If a speciﬁc level (or
levels) were explicitly identiﬁed on the website, but not in the regular “pledge now” page, we included it as
a separate contribution level.15 We accessed these websites between May 22, 2009, and June 7, 2009. At
those times, no scheduled membership campaigns were ongoing.
13We use Table 2a available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t29/index.html for our deﬁ-
nitions of metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas.
14Often, two kinds of membership are oﬀered, one without gift and one with gifts. In case the levels with gift did not
correspond to the level without gift, we considered the level with gift as an additional level, as long as it did not fall within ﬁve
dollars of any level without gift. To deal with diﬀerent payment plans, e.g. monthly or once for the whole year, we annualized
all amounts without discounting.
15We did not include donations in kind, donations of stocks, charitable gift annuities and donations of other ﬁnancial in-
struments. Whenever the website belongs to an organization operating jointly a TV station and a NPR station, we excluded
TV-related gifts from our calculations.
22We then collected aggregate economic and demographic characteristic of each geographic area, including
population, income, education, racial makeup, voting percentage, population density and commuting time.16
We chose population as a straightforward approximation to the number of potential donors to the public
good. We chose income as a proxy for willingness to pay for the public good. We added the other variables
in the attempt to control for other factors that may aﬀect the willingness to pay for the public good. In our
choices we are guided by our own experience that much radio listening happens in the car, and by what various
NPR stations websites say about their listeners in their “Underwriting” or “Business Sponsorship” pages.
In particular, beyond high income and high education, civic activism is often mentioned as a distinguishing
characteristic of NPR listeners, and we proxy this with voting behavior.
Finally, we collected information on CPB funding from their most recent annual report available on their
website, http://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/reports. We use the information to create a cross section with the
following information for each network of NPR stations (we consider a stand-alone NPR station as a network
of one): (1) number of diﬀerent default membership levels; (2) adult population; (3) income inequality and
median income; (4) CPB support; and (5) other economic, demographic, and political controls.
Before presenting our basic estimations, we describe the variables of greater interest in more detail,
beginning with the number of suggested contribution levels. Their distribution is reported in Table 3, which
shows a fair amount of dispersion and where the largest number of levels suggested is 21. A small percentage
of the sample (3.8%) oﬀered no pre-speciﬁed levels. In our estimations, we excluded these few observations
for two reasons. The ﬁrst is theoretical: we believe there is a marked discontinuity between oﬀering only
one membership level, and simply leaving any contributor free to donate as much as he wants without any
suggestion, guidance, or inducement level. If we were to include the observation where no suggested level
appears, we believe we should include them at the other extreme; that is we feel that a membership scheme
with no suggested levels is much closer in the ﬂexibility it allows the contributor to a scheme with 21 possible
levels, rather than to one with only one possible membership level. The second reason is that a large fraction
of the stations oﬀering no speciﬁed membership level appear to be very tightly connected to a higher-level
institution, such as a university. This connection is so tight that, sometimes, following the “pledge now”
link, one is sent to the university donation webpage. It is not entirely clear to us how to view such strict
linkage and the eﬀects it may have on the membership policy of the NPR station.
The adult population (persons over 18) for each geographic area served by a network are reported in
Table 4. Here, too, there is fair dispersion in the data, with the largest population in excess of 13 million for
stations covering the New York metropolitan area and a small percentage of stations (5.8% of the sample)
covering a population less than 50,000. In our estimations we excluded the 15 NPR networks serving a
16These are derived from from “USA Counties” data ﬁles, available at http://www.census.gov/support/DataDownload.htm.
23Table 3: The distribution of the number of suggested contribution levels
Number of default contribution levels
suggested by NPR network Frequency Percent Cumulative
None 10 3.86 3.86
1 4 1.54 5.41
2 1 0.39 5.79
3 5 1.93 7.72
4 4 1.54 9.27
5 8 3.09 12.36
6 31 11.97 24.32
7 19 7.34 31.66
8 28 10.81 42.47
9 30 11.58 54.05
10 26 10.04 64.09
11 25 9.65 73.75
12 23 8.88 82.63
13 19 7.34 89.96
14 7 2.70 92.66
15 5 1.93 94.59
16 4 1.54 96.14
17 3 1.16 97.30
18 1 0.39 97.68
19 3 1.16 98.84
20 1 0.39 99.23
21 2 0.77 100.00
Total 259
population less than 50,000. They cover remote parts of the country, with no metropolitan or micropolitan
areas, or very small ones. Moreover, they tend to be very tightly connected to institutions like Native
American Nations or Reservations. In our estimations we also excluded “statewide” NPR networks (e.g.,
Georgia Public Broadcasting). We have 15 statewide networks in our sample. We are especially concerned
about the inﬂuence of state legislatures or state boards of education in their creation and operation.17
The ﬁgures for the amount of CPB support, excluding the “statewide” NPR networks, are reported in
Table 5. We have only included the total of “Radio Community Service Grants” and “Radio Programming
Grants,” leaving out other forms of grants—for example, “Digital Support Grants”—that appear much less
common and permanent. The notable feature in the data is that the overwhelming majority of stations
receive some funding but less than $800,000. Of the 9 NPR networks out of 244 we could not ﬁnd an amount
for, three oﬀer no membership levels and one has population smaller than than 50,000; therefore they are
excluded based on earlier considerations. We feel it is better to eliminate also the remaining ﬁve rather than
17It is also somewhat problematic to obtain reliable and complete geographical coverage data. For example, Georgia Public
Broadcasting does not have a station in Atlanta, but its radio programming can be heard on the second audio program of its
TV station. To avoid such complications, we exclude these observations.
24Table 4: Adult populations of NPR networks’ audiences
Total adult population served
by an NPR network Frequency Percent Cumulative
less than 50,000 15 5.79 5.79
between 50,000 and 100,000 10 3.86 9.65
between 100,000 and 200,000 26 10.04 19.69
between 200,000 and 300,000 23 8.88 28.57
between 300,000 and 400,000 26 10.04 38.61
between 400,000 and 500,000 23 8.88 47.49
between 500,000 and 600,000 10 3.86 51.35
between 600,000 and 700,000 9 3.47 54.83
between 700,000 and 800,000 6 2.32 57.14
between 800,000 and 900,000 7 2.70 59.85
between 900,000 and 1000,000 13 5.02 64.86
between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 24 9.27 74.13
between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 12 4.63 78.76
between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 16 6.18 84.94
between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 22 8.49 93.44
between 4,000,000 and 8,000,000 10 3.86 97.30
more than 8,000,000 7 2.70 100.00
Total 259
assigning them a value of zero.18
We constructed our income variables as follows. The census data provides number of households with
income falling in diﬀerent intervals (e.g., $15,000 to $20,000) by county or by metropolitan or micropolitan
area. Because our geographic unit of interest is the area covered by an NPR network, which may be
a combination of all three—county, metropolitan area, and micropolitan area—we ﬁrst aggregated these
numbers. We then calculated the percentage of households in the area covered by the NPR network with
incomes below $15,000 and with incomes above $150,000. Finally, as our measure of median income we
used the mid-point of the median income interval in the network coverage area.19 After all the eliminations
described above, we are left with 216 out of 259 observations.20
The unconditioned relation between number of default contribution levels and adult population turns
out to be non-linear, nicely accommodated with a logarithmic transformation of population as depicted
in Figure 6. (This and the following ﬁgures are in the Appendix.) The unconditioned relation between
contribution levels and proportion of households with income above $150,000 is depicted in Figure 7, while
the relation for households with income below $15,000 is depicted in Figure 8. While Figures 6 and 7 display
18The six “super” NPR networks that receive more than $800,000 deserve a special advance mention as well (see Fig-
ures 9a and 9b).
19Brush (2007) uses similar measures of income when analyzing income inequality and crime.
20Our results are not qualitatively aﬀected by marginally diﬀerent inclusion rules, with the caveat described above for stations
that do not oﬀer pre-speciﬁed membership levels, in the sense that the variables of interest remain statistically signiﬁcant, albeit
sometimes less precisely estimated.
25Table 5: NPR network support from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
CPB support in dollars for
non-statewide NPR networks Frequency Percent Cumulative
nothing 9 3.69 3.69
less than 50,000 5 2.05 5.74
between 50,000 and 100,000 27 11.07 16.80
between 100,000 and 150,000 57 23.36 40.16
between 150,000 and 200,000 49 20.08 60.25
between 200,000 and 250,000 28 11.48 71.72
between 250,000 and 300,000 22 9.02 80.74
between 300,000 and 400,000 14 5.74 86.48
between 400,000 and 500,000 14 5.74 92.21
between 500,000 and 600,000 8 3.28 95.49
between 600,000 and 700,000 4 1.64 97.13
between 700,000 and 800,000 1 0.41 97.54
between 800,000 and 900,000 0 0.00 97.54
between 900,000 and 1000,000 0 0.00 97.54
between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 4 1.64 99.18
between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 1 0.41 99.59
between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 1 0.41 100.00
Total 244
patterns that conform to our theoretical intuitions, the relation for poorer households is far less obvious—a
linear speciﬁcation is not statistically signiﬁcant—without conditioning on the other variables of interest.
Finally, the unconditioned relation between contribution levels and CPB support is depicted in Figure 9a.
Our theoretical intuitions about crowding out are consistent with the pattern displayed for all observations
but the six “super” NPR networks with CPB support larger than $800,000, as Figure 9b, which excludes
them, clearly shows.
5.2 Results
We present in Table 6 the results of the multivariate OLS regressions. We estimate 4 diﬀerent equations.
On the left-hand side they have the number of default membership levels. On the right-hand side of each
equation, we place
F1. Weights for the upper and the lower tails of the income distribution conditional on median income,
F2. Natural logarithm of adult population,
F3. The amount provided by the CPB;
along with the control variables described in Table 6. For item F1, income, we investigate a “restrictive”
deﬁnition of income tails, that is $150,000 and $15,000, and a more “expansive” deﬁnition, namely, $125,000
26Table 6: Dependent variable: number of default contribution levels proposed by an NPR network
F1 restrictive F1 expansive F1 restrictive F1 expansive
Estimation speciﬁcation F3 expansive F3 expansive F3 restrictive F3 restrictive
F1 Logarithm of median income Coef. 2.7848 2.4107 3.2802 3.2168
Robust std. err. 4.1431 4.4980 4.0947 4.4587
Proportion of households with Coef. 46.8526∗∗ 51.8445∗∗
income less than $15,000 Robust std. err. 15.6873 15.7803
Proportion of households with Coef. 68.8656∗ 88.5262∗
income more than $150,000 Robust std. err. 32.9170 32.4355
Proportion of households with Coef. 38.9495∗∗ 45.0427∗∗
income less than $20,000 Robust std. err. 14.5569 14.7979
Proportion of households with Coef. 52.0413∗ 67.2287∗∗
income more than $125,000 Robust std. err. 24.4330 24.2793
F2 Logarithm of population Coef. 1.3231∗∗ 1.3131∗∗ 1.3898∗∗ 1.3930∗∗
over 18 years of age Robust std. err. 0.3251 0.3245 0.3333 0.3331
F3 CPB support in 100,000’s Coef. 0.5361∗ 0.5452∗ 0.5546∗∗ 0.5691∗∗
Robust std. err. 0.2475 0.2471 0.2122 0.2118
CPB support in 100,000’s squared Coef. −0.0285∗ −0.0284∗
Robust std. err. 0.011 0.011
other Votes cast in 2000 presidential election Coef. −2.3998 −2.4038 −3.1181 −3.1138
controls over adult population Robust std. err. 4.8363 4.8777 4.8824 4.9169
Average commute time for workers Coef. −0.1635 −0.1595 −0.2134 −0.2123
not working at home Robust std. err. 0.1210 0.1222 0.1228 0.1239
Proportion of population with health Coef. 21.0397∗ 21.4529∗ 23.0523∗ 23.4594∗
insurance coverage Robust std. err. 10.0115 10.1768 10.1031 10.2708
Proportion of population that is white Coef. −3.0556 −3.8503 −3.2176 −4.1451
Robust std. err. 2.9532 3.0500 2.9025 3.0123
Prop. of population 25 years and over with Coef. −9.0871 −8.9310 −11.6717 −12.0193
bachelor’s, graduate, or professional degree Robust std. err. 6.3997 6.7988 6.5042 6.9367
Employed civilian labor force over Coef. 48.7552 50.0920 49.2265 53.0112
total labor force Robust std. err. 28.0912 28.1032 28.1096 28.1763
Population density as population over Coef. −0.0007 −0.0006 −0.0014 −0.0013
land in square miles Robust std. err. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014
Male-to-Female ratio for population Coef. 18.1423∗∗ 17.5514∗∗ 18.3103∗∗ 18.0205∗∗
over 16 years of age Robust std. err. 6.5709 6.6412 6.5568 6.6327
Constant Coef. −120.0880∗ −118.3760 −127.8379∗ −132.6367∗
Robust std. err. 56.9801 61.8886 56.3268 61.6387
R squared 0.2589 0.2515 0.2806 0.2735
Number of observations 216 216 210 210
* Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Note: All independent variables are for the year 2000 with the exception of income variables, which are for the year 1999, and
CPB support, which is for the year 2007.
27and $20,000. For item F3, CPB support, we investigate a “restrictive” linear estimate that excludes the six
observations with CPB support larger than $800,000, and an “expansive” quadratic estimate that includes
these observations. The diﬀerent combinations give rise to the 4 columns in Table 6.
The basic relationships reported in Table 6 are in broad agreement with our theoretical hypotheses. For
income, item F1, both the coeﬃcient for the upper tail and the coeﬃcient for the lower tail of the income
distribution are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, in accordance with prediction P1. The coeﬃcient on
the natural logarithm of adult population is positive and signiﬁcant, so F2 is in accordance with P2. The
coeﬃcients on the amount provided by the CPB, item F3, imply a positive relationship between number of
default level and CPB support for all but the six “super” networks with CPB support larger than $800,000.21
This broad pattern is conﬁrmed as well using a quadratic speciﬁcation for population, especially if one
excludes the six “super” networks. Therefore, we feel justiﬁed in claiming that empirical patterns are
consistent with our theoretical intuitions.22
6 Conclusion
Fundraisers may proﬁt from restricting donors’ possible levels of contribution because such restrictions can
induce some people to contribute more than they otherwise would. But this beneﬁt must be weighed against
the cost that these restrictions can also induce some people to give less than they otherwise would. The
relative importance of these two eﬀects determines whether such restrictions are indeed proﬁtable.
Using a subscription game framework to study the private provision of a discrete public good, we have
identiﬁed several factors militating in favor of greater ﬂexibility for contributors. If the distribution of
players’ values is concave, then the ﬂexible (continuous) contribution framework yields greater revenue. For
symmetric distributions of players’ values having a density that is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing, the
ﬂexible scheme is again preferred as i) the dispersion of donors’ taste for the public good increases, ii) the
number of potential donors increases, and iii) there is greater funding by an external authority. These
predictions of the model are supported by fundraising practices of NPR stations in the US. We found that
these stations oﬀer a larger number of suggested contribution levels as i) the incomes of the population
served become more diverse, ii) the population of the coverage area increases, and iii) there is greater
external support from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
21The estimated maximum for the quadratic is about $950,000.
22Among control variables, the male-to-female ratio is deserving of mention. The regressions indicate that the larger the
percentage of males, the more ﬂexible the membership contract oﬀered. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) provide evidence
from dictator games that “...men are more likely to be either perfectly selﬁsh or perfectly selﬂess, whereas women tend
to be ‘equalitarians’ who prefer to share evenly.” Should the larger heterogeneity in men’s preferences extend to the public
good “NPR,” then the positive coeﬃcient in our regressions for male-to-female ratio would be consistent with the theoretical
prediction in Proposition 4.
28The more direct implications of our results concern fund raising: We identify easily obtainable char-
acteristic of the target donor population that should be taken into account in the practical design of a
campaign. Moreover, the forces behind our results appear to be relevant for more widely deﬁned collective
eﬀort problems, such as team production. Our most general message is that the design of a campaign af-
fects the responses of contributors in ways that at times are predictable. Exploiting such responses may
prove valuable for further research. For instance, our model suggests that, when faced with a rigid donation
scheme, contributions from very high or very low value donors are less easily crowded-out than those from
donors with intermediate values. This observation may be of help to the large literature on crowding out.23
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the value of our empirical exercise lies in the novelty of the data
about membership levels and in the simultaneous match of various empirical correlations with theoretical
predictions. More empirical research is needed in the directions that our model points out. Our results on
the determination of the best discrete-contribution levels may also oﬀer guidance to experimental analysis,
making it possible to design experiments that have the potential to actually test whether oﬀering membership
categories can raise total contributions.
23See, e.g., Manzoor and Straub (2005) and references therein.
29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by contradiction: given Kd ≥ Kc we assume v0 ≥ µ and show this leads
to the contradictory conclusion that Kd < Kc. Now suppose Kd ≥ Kc and v0 ≥ µ. Because v0 ≥ µ and F
is strictly concave ∀v > v0, part 2 of Lemma 1 implies xd < [1 − (n − 1)Kd]/2 ≤ [1 − (n − 1)Kc]/2, where
the second inequality follows from the assumption Kd ≥ Kc. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1












= xd(1 − E[F(v)|ϕ]), (120)
where ϕ denotes a uniform probability distribution on the interval [(n − 1)Kc,(n − 1)Kc + 2xd].
We now separate the parameter space into three exhaustive regions and show that, in all three, (120)
implies Kc > Kd. In the ﬁrst region µ ≤ (n − 1)Kc, so that F is strictly concave for the relevant range of
the integral in (120), so that
Kc > xd(1 − F(E[v |ϕ]) = xd[1 − F((n − 1)Kc + xd)]
≥ xd[1 − F((n − 1)Kd + xd)]
= Kd.
In the second region µ ≥ (n − 1)Kc + 2xd, so from (120) we obtain
Kc > xd(1 − E[F(v)|ϕ])
≥ xd[1 − F(v0)]
= Kd,
where the second inequality follows because F(v) ≤ F(v0) for every v in the support of ϕ by the assumption
v0 ≥ µ.
We proceed to the analysis of the third and ﬁnal region, (n − 1)Kc < µ < (n − 1)Kc + 2xd, with the
help of Figure 5. We ﬁrst deﬁne a new distribution function H that agrees with F for v < (n − 1)Kc and
v > 2µ − (n − 1)Kc, but, for (n − 1)Kc ≤ v ≤ 2µ − (n − 1)Kc, H is equal to the straight line connecting
points A and B:
H(v) =
F(2µ − (n − 1)Kc) − F((n − 1)Kc)
2(µ − (n − 1)Kc)
(v − (n − 1)Kc) + F((n − 1)Kc).
30One can easily verify that H inherits symmetry around µ from F, using H(µ+z)+H(µ−z) = 1,∀z ∈ [0,µ].
Moreover, the curvature properties of F imply H(µ) = F(µ), H(v) ≥ F(v) if v < µ, and H(v) ≤ F(v) if
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Figure 5: Linearization of F about its mean/median.












= xd [1 − E[H(v)|ϕ]]
≥ xd [1 − H(E[v|ϕ])]. (18)
If E[v |ϕ] < µ, then (18) implies Kc > xd/2 ≥ xd(1 − F(v0)) = Kd. If E[v |ϕ] ≥ µ, then, because
31F(v) ≥ H(v) ∀v ≥ µ, (18) implies
Kc > xd [1 − F(E[v |ϕ])] = xd[1 − F((n − 1)Kc + xd)] ≥ xd[1 − F((n − 1)Kd + xd)] = Kd.
Thus, in all cases, if Kd ≥ Kc, then v0 ≥ µ is impossible, so it must be that v0 < µ.
Proof of Proposition 6. Making explicit our focus on the amount y, we denote with Kc(y) the solution to
(15) and with Kd(y) the solution for Kd of (16). It is immediate to verify that both Kc(y) and Kd(y)



























1 − F((n − 1)Kc) + y
2 + (n − 1)(1 − F((n − 1)Kc + y))
, (19)









1 + (n − 1)(1 − F(v0))
. (20)
Moreover, we can replicate the same steps leading to Proposition 2 for the case y > 0 and reach the same
conclusion: Kd ≥ Kc implies v0 < µ. Simple algebra on equations (19) and (20) shows that the result
follows if
1 − 2F(v0) + F((n − 1)Kc + y) > 0,
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